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Zur Grundlegung der Logik; ein Beitrag zur Bestimmung des Verhältnisses zwischen Logik und Psychologie. Von Dr. STEPHEN MATICEVIC. Wien und Leipzig, W. Braumüller, 1909. pp. iii., 192. Price Mk. 3.

This work, which is a revised and enlarged edition of a doctor's dissertation presented to the Vienna faculty in 1906, seeks, as its title implies, to determine the relation between psychology and logic. The writer makes his position clear in the preface. The controversy between psychologism and anti-psychologism has been regarded by some, he says, as a mere continuation of the age-long quarrel of empiricism and rationalism, and has accordingly been passed by in silence and apathy. Others, impressed by Husserl's campaign against psychologism, have accepted, along with that author's critical results, his positive advocacy of a scholastic 'pure logic.' Dr. Maticevic himself aims to prove that one may be anti-psychologistic without thereby becoming a 'pure' logician.

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The Introduction is followed by three chapters, on the basis (Begründung) of logic at large, on logic as transcendental psychology, and on empirical psychologism. Limits of space forbid

more than a brief summary of the Conclusion.

We must take as datum the empirical antithesis of subject and object. We must recognize also that, wherever a theory of reality is in question, the objective is prior and superior to the subjective. Now logic, the most general, formal knowledge of the nature of things, is objectively determined, has the objective as its basis; and it is this objective character that distinguishes logic from psychology, and stamps it as an objective natural science of the same kind as geometry or arithmetic. The customary interpretation of the laws of formal logic as merely analytical formulas elevates the act of thought at the expense of the content of thought, and so transforms logical laws into psychological. In truth, the objective element cannot be eliminated from any form of knowledge that is to be valid for the objectively real, and the laws of logic are, despite their poverty of content, synthetic propositions that express certain properties of objects.

How are these contentions to be established? By the proof, brought in the body of the work, that all the psychologies, transcendental or other, however strenuously they endeavor to expel the object, trip over it in their doctrine of the Ichbewusstsein or the Bewusstsein überhaupt. It is true that, so far as the synthetic nature of the laws of formal logic is concerned, this proof is negative only; the formulas are shown to be more than tautological, but the character of their content has not been particularized. It may be suggested, in detail, that the objective content of the law of identity must be constituted by the empirically real identity (constancy) of things themselves; the proposition 'A=A' is best formulated in the terms 'A remains A', which is an existential proposition, and therefore a synthetic judgment. The laws of contradiction and of excluded middle are simply the obverse and specification of the law of identity, and need no further explanation. It is possible that the underlying objective, in all three cases, is to be found in space-perception; but this question requires a separate discussion. Finally, the principle of sufficient reason, in its general form, simply expresses the requirement that a logical derivation of some sort be possible; its logical content depends, therefore, in part upon this general character, in part upon the special problem of the moment; recourse may be had, with greatest prospect of success, to the principle of subsumption. In a word, then, "unser ganzes Wissen um die Natur der Dinge," logical knowledge included, "ist bei den Dingen selbst zu suchen." F. Jones.